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Abstract
The act of diagnosing gender dysphoria (GD), as in the act of diagnosing any other 
condition, is structured by socio-cultural, political and economic factors and is con-
ducted by social actors. Drawing upon in-depth interviews with practitioners who 
work with trans people in Portugal, the study reveals the nuances and complexities 
surrounding the diagnostic attribution of GD and the ways in which the ideologies 
regarding gender shape this attribution. Practitioners’ accounts show a diversity not 
often acknowledged within sociological and transgender literature. We extend previ-
ous studies by demonstrating that practitioners who operate under a social model of 
gender are opening space for trans people to be treated as experts of their bodies and 
identities by accepting the existence of those who identify beyond gender binaries. 
While it might not be true for practitioners who can be positioned within a biologi-
cal model, thus attributing an essentialist explanation of gender, we found evidence 
that practitioners who follow a social model are allowing room for the self-definition 
of gender identification. The study provides another lens for understanding the diag-
nostic attribution of GD by paying attention to the accounts of practitioners who 
work with trans people and reveals their openness towards a collaborative model of 
care.
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Introduction
Trans people in Portugal (Pinto and Moleiro 2012) and in other countries with 
a welfare state (Linander et  al. 2017a) need to obtain a diagnosis of Gender 
Dysphoria (GD) to access gender-confirming medical procedures (i.e. hormone 
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therapy and/or gender-confirming surgery). The field of GD has been marked 
by conflicting arguments regarding its definition and its establishment as a psy-
chiatric diagnosis category as it enhanced the pathologization of trans identities 
(Dewey and Gesbeck 2017). While we do not intend to provide here a detailed 
analysis of the struggles surrounding depathologization, it is important to out-
line that this involves objections to how medical institutions have constructed GD 
and the power that have been given to medical professionals on behalf of society 
in general for controlling access to gender-confirming medical procedures and 
therefore maintaining a gender binary order (Davis et al. 2016). When employing 
a gatekeeping role, practitioners limit the access to GD diagnosis to trans people 
if they do not meet the expectations of what they consider to be the appropriate 
gender (Johnson 2015).
Following this train of thought, trans medical encounters appear to be marked 
by the search for the true or authentic trans identity (McQueen 2016) which draws 
upon the imaginary of binary genders. Within this imaginary, gender identity is 
derived from genitalia and it is deeply interwoven with heterosexuality, which 
structures gender (Schilt and Westbrook 2009). Those who do not present a fixed 
and stable gender identity across the life course (McQueen 2016) and who do 
not wish to undergo gender-confirming surgery to align their assigned gender at 
birth with their gender identity (Johnson 2015) might not be considered to be 
trans enough (Mog and Swarr 2008) to obtain GD as they challenge the gen-
der binary order (Davis et  al. 2016). What this appears to suggest is that trans-
specific healthcare tends to draw upon an essentialist/biologist ideology which 
pathologises gender variance (Davis et  al. 2016). Indeed, by employing a gate-
keeping role, practitioners are not recognizing gender diversity and might to a 
certain extent be harming trans people who do not define themselves within a 
gender binary framework (Hilário 2018).
GD is a prime example of how the attribution of a disorder for which there are 
no confirmatory biomarkers or scientific tests can be particularly challenging for 
medicine (Shuster 2016) and might not always work in the best interests of trans 
people (Davis et al. 2016) as they might feel pressured to fit into a clinical category 
(Turowetz and Maynard 2016). Without biological evidence to support decisions on 
GD, and as the diagnostic attribution is based upon the “distress that may accom-
pany the incongruence between one’s experienced or expressed gender and one’s 
assigned gender” (APA 2013, p. 451), practitioners tend to deal with the uncertainty 
that characterizes the diagnosis of GD by employing gatekeeping practices that are 
understood by them as a tool to prevent regret regarding permanent bodily interven-
tions such as genital surgery and infertility due to hormone therapy (Shuster 2016). 
Thus, there is a danger that practitioners base their decisions on the attribution of 
GD on their own assumptions regarding the nature of gender (Whitehead et  al. 
2012) which might not allow room for the gender self-definition of trans people 
(Linander et al. 2017b). Research into the diagnosis of GD and its attribution that 
has privileged the standpoint of practitioners concerning this matter is scarce, par-
ticularly in non-English speaking countries (Richard et al. 2014). This paper intends 
to overcome this gap and shed light on how the ideologies employed by practitioners 
regarding gender shape the diagnostic attribution of GD to trans people in Portugal.
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An overview of the diagnosis of gender dysphoria
Transsexualism was the first diagnostic category used under the umbrella of psycho-
sexual disorders in 1980; fourteen years later it was reclassified under sexual disor-
ders and, more recently, it was removed from the section on sexual dysfunction and 
paraphilic disorders in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders of 
the American Psychiatric Association—APA (Hilário 2018). The name change from 
Gender Identity Disorder (1994) to Gender Dysphoria (2013) in DSM was intended 
to destigmatize and depathologize trans people by paying attention to the distress 
experienced due to gender non-conformity rather than diagnosing everyone who 
experienced gender incongruence (Dewey and Gesbeck 2017). These changes fol-
lowed the recommendation of the World Health Organization (WHO) in the Inter-
national Statistical Classification of Diseases and Related Health Problems (ICD). 
While this paper was being written, the WHO released an updated version of ICD-
11 on 18 June 2018, within which this diagnostic category is to be placed under the 
umbrella of conditions relating to sexual health. It is expected that changes in DSM 
will take place. Until then, practitioners who work with trans people in Portugal 
and elsewhere still follow the clinical guidance of the American Psychiatric Asso-
ciation in DSM-5 (APA 2013) and the recommendations in the 7th version of the 
Standards of Care (SOC) for the Health of Transsexual, Transgender, and Gender 
Nonconforming People (WPATH 2011). While in SOC-7 a recommendation letter 
to access gender-confirming medical procedures is no longer necessary, trans people 
must still demonstrate that they experience persistent GD and a psychosocial assess-
ment by a qualified practitioner to ensure they have the capacity to make informed 
decisions is mandatory (Dewey and Gesbeck 2017). The SOC-7 outlines a collabo-
rative approach to care, based on an informed consent model, as a means to pro-
vide answers to problems concerning access, provision and delivery of trans-specific 
healthcare across the globe (Davy 2015).
The Portuguese context
Research conducted so far in Portugal, which has examined practitioners’ and trans 
people’s experiences of healthcare, has not sufficiently addressed the process of the 
diagnostic attribution of GD (Pinto and Moleiro 2012). The country offers an inter-
esting context in which to explore the lives of trans people, as it has been at the fore-
front of LGBT rights. It was the first European country to prohibit discrimination 
based on sexual orientation in its Constitution and the eighth country worldwide 
to legally accept same sex marriage (Santos 2013). The 2011 Gender Identity Law, 
which aimed to facilitate the legalization of gender and name changes, is also rep-
resentative of LGBT rights in Portugal. Since the approval of this law, trans people 
can change their birth certificate by presenting the diagnosis of GD to the Portu-
guese Civil Registry. A diagnosis of GD must be obtained from two independent, 
medical and/or psychological practitioners who are part of a list approved by the 
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Medical Council1 and it is the first step in the medical transitioning process, prior 
to gender-confirming medical procedures. All trans people who have a diagnosis 
of GD can access, through the welfare state, psychological/psychiatric support by 
a mental health practitioner as well as hormone therapy by an endocrinologist in 
five public hospitals across the country and gender-confirming surgery in a hospital 
located in the centre of Portugal (Hilário 2018). A law which establishes the right to 
a legal gender recognition procedure based on self-determination has been recently 
approved by the Portuguese parliament with the support of the government and left 
wing parties (Decree Law No. 203/XIII)2. This law enables the separation of medi-
cal and legal gender recognition. The terms self-determination and self-definition 
of gender identification will be used interchangeably here as one signifies the other 
(Hilário 2018).
Terminology
For the current study, we will use the abbreviated term trans to refer to people who, 
in general terms, do not feel aligned with the gender assigned to them at birth and to 
avoid an unnecessary distinction between transsexual and transgender people (Pfef-
fer 2010; Hilário 2018). While the term transsexual has commonly been used within 
the medical domain to describe, in the main, individuals who have done (or wish to 
do) gender-confirming medical procedures to align their physical body with their 
gender identity, the term transgender refers not only to transsexual people, but also 
to individuals who do not wish to undergo gender-confirming medical procedures, 
albeit they do not feel aligned with their gender assigned at birth, and refers to dif-
ferent gender identities and expressions (Sanger 2010; Hilário 2018). Trans people 
might wish to pursue hormone therapy (for breast augmentation, body hair devel-
opment, menstrual cessation and/or clitoris enlargement), top surgery (for breast 
augmentation or removal), chest and/or facial reconstruction and genital surgery 
(namely metoidioplasty or phalloplasty and vaginoplasty). Voice therapy or body 
hair removal might be important for trans people as well as other non-medical pro-
cedures such as packing, tucking and binding. In Portugal, and in other non-Anglo-
phone countries (Platero 2011), the term transsexual has been used independently 
of the gender-confirming medical procedures that the person has done or wishes to 
do (Pinto and Moleiro 2015). Trans people might define themselves within a binary 
(either man or woman) or non-binary model of gender (neither man nor woman). 
The latter is the case of genderqueer individuals. While transgender is an identity, 
GD is a diagnostic category that refers to individuals who experience distress due to 
the incongruence they feel between their experienced or expressed gender and their 
assigned gender at birth (APA 2013; Shuster 2016; Hilário 2018).
2 Available at: http://app.parla mento .pt/webut ils/docs/doc.pdf?path=61485 23063 446f7 64c32 46795 
95842 774f6 a6333 4e7a6 37664 326c7 55a47 566a6 36d56 30623 34d76 57456 c4a53 53396 b5a57 4d794 d444d 
74574 56c4a 53533 56b62 324d3 d&fich=dec20 3-XIII.doc&Inlin e=true.
1 Available at: http://www.irn.mj.pt/IRN/secti ons/irn/a_regis tral/regis to-civil /docs-do-civil /lista -de-clini 
cos/downl oadFi le/file/Lista _profi ssion ais_habil itado s_assin ar_relat orios .pdf?nocac he=14362 74751 .05.
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Background
Research suggests that practitioners tend to limit the attribution of GD diagnosis 
and access to trans-specific healthcare to trans identities which do not correspond 
to their gender expectations (Davis et al. 2016). Within sociological and transgen-
der literature, it has been said that practitioners’ expectations about trans people 
tend to draw upon the heterosexual imaginary, i.e. “that way of thinking which 
conceals the operation of heterosexuality in structuring gender and closes off any 
critical analysis of heterosexuality as an organizing institution” (Ingraham 1994, 
pp. 203–204). Thus, trans people who correspond to these heteronormative ide-
als are those who intend to align their assigned gender at birth with their gender 
identity through gender-confirming medical procedures, particularly genital sur-
gery (Davis et  al. 2016) and to engage in heteronormative relationships (Schilt 
and Westbrook 2009).
As heterosexuality is “predicated on the seemingly natural attraction between 
two types of bodies defined as opposites”, it is understandable that what is at 
the heart of heteronormativity is the “taken-for-granted expectation that hetero-
sexuality and gender identity follow from genitalia” (Schilt and Westbrook 2009, 
p. 443). Trans people who do not correspond to the heteronormative ideal of 
female-bodied women and male-bodied men challenge heteronormativity, there-
fore presenting a contradictory embodiment (Connell 2012), so they are placed 
in a less privileged position than those who correspond to the imaginary of gen-
der binary (Johnson 2015). Within this light, trans people might feel the need to 
do transgender (Connell 2010) to obtain the diagnosis of GD and thereby access 
trans-specific healthcare and/or legal gender recognition (Dewey and Gesbeck 
2017; Hilário 2017). Within the diagnostic attribution of GD, practitioners tend 
to place an unnecessary burden on trans people to define themselves in accord 
with the gender binary imaginary and to be certain about undergoing gender-con-
firming medical procedures to align their assigned gender at birth with their gen-
der identity, i.e. to correspond to the authentic trans ideal (Johnson 2015; Davis 
et al. 2016).
When practitioners decide who is an authentic trans person and can therefore 
access the diagnosis of GD, they appear to operate under an essentialist/biologi-
cal model within which gender identity is understood as a product of biological 
processes (Johnson 2015). The biological model locates gender identity within 
the individual’s brain and draws upon the assumption that cross-gender identi-
fication is persistent from birth. This position contrasts with that expressed by 
practitioners who tend to operate under a social model, which understands gender 
identity as being something flexible and mutable (Whitehead et al. 2012). Thus, 
practitioners who operate under a social model might open space for non-binary 
gender identities by allowing room for trans people to define themselves in their 
own terms. While there is some work on the diagnostic attribution of GD (John-
son 2015; Davis et al. 2016; McQueen 2016; Dewey and Gesbeck 2017), little has 
been said about how, within this diagnostic attribution, practitioners might chal-
lenge dominant ideologies concerning gender by opening space to the existence 
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of other forms of gender identity and expression outside the binary gender 
(Whitehead et al. 2012), especially in the Portuguese context. Portugal is charac-
terized by a strong welfare state and as such states tend to be characterized by a 
paternalistic approach (Linander et al. 2017b); it is not surprising that practition-
ers employ gatekeeping practices that limit access to trans-specific healthcare of 
trans people who do not conform to the gender binary ideal (Pinto and Moleiro 
2012). This might, nevertheless, not be so straightforward in the light of the polit-
ical debate surrounding the self-determination of trans people that has recently 
taken place there (Hilário 2018).
Methods
Overview of the study
This article draws evidence from a wider study about trans lives and the institutional 
apparatus that frames them. The TRANSRIGHTS: Gender citizenship and sexual 
rights in Europe: Transgender lives in transnational perspective study intends to 
explore how legal and institutional frameworks impact on the lives of trans people 
in five European countries—Portugal, the United Kingdom, France, Sweden and the 
Netherlands. These countries were chosen due to their different institutional frame-
works concerning gender and sexuality, welfare policies and practices, and sexual 
and transgender rights (Castagnoli 2010). However, for this article we focus on prac-
titioners who work with trans people in Portugal as it was the only country while 
this article was being written where fieldwork has been completed. To address the 
overall aim of the study, a qualitative research approach was adopted and in-depth 
interviews with practitioners were carried out by the TRANSRIGHTS team (identi-
fied here as T) during 2016. The interviews followed an interview schedule open 
enough to capture individual singularities and included questions such as: Which 
steps and requisites are necessary to establish a diagnosis? What is your role in 
that process? What type of diagnosis is needed today? When do you know a person 
should really change their gender? Do most trans people want gender-confirming 
surgery or not? What do you normally say to people who do not want to change their 
genitalia, or do not have a defined gender? We will pay specific attention here to the 
diagnostic attribution of Gender Dysphoria.
Participants
Participants were recruited via a list of practitioners, approved by the Medical Council,3 
who were able to confirm and sign the diagnosis of Gender Dysphoria which would 
enable trans people to access gender-confirming medical procedures, as well as legally 
change their gender and name. Whereas the law on gender self-determination4 was 
3 See footnote 1.
4 See footnote 2.
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approved while this article was being written, the 2011 Gender Identity Law was still in 
place when the interviews for this study were being conducted by the TRANSRIGHTS 
team. An email explaining the study and asking for collaboration was sent to the practi-
tioners mentioned in the list. Participants were also recruited through snowball sampling, 
as social networks were used to contact some practitioners. Ten practitioners, namely four 
psychologists, four psychiatrists and two endocrinologists, with a specialization in sexol-
ogy, agreed to be interviewed. The practitioners were aged between 30 and 70 and had 
between 10 and 40 years’ experience of working with trans people; two worked exclu-
sively in the public system; four in the private system; four both in the public and pri-
vate sector, and all practitioners, except for one medical practitioner, specialized in trans 
issues. The small number of participants reflects the limited number of practitioners who 
can work with trans people and sign the diagnosis of GD according to the list.
Procedure
Ethical approval was granted by the Instituto de Ciências Sociais, Universidade de Lis-
boa and the European Research Council Executive Agency. Clearance was also given 
by the Portuguese National Commission for Data Protection. Information about the 
aims and procedures of the study and that their participation was voluntary was pro-
vided to participants. They were also aware of their right to skip any question and to 
withdraw from the study at any stage. The terms of confidentiality and use of the infor-
mation gathered in the interview were outlined. It was made clear that results would be 
reported in such a way that no individual would be identifiable. The interviews were 
conducted in practitioners’ offices after they signed the informed consent form, and 
lasted between 1 and 3 h. All the interviews were tape recorded with participants’ per-
mission and, after verbatim transcription in Portuguese by a member of the TRAN-
SRIGHTS team, were transferred to the MAXqda2007 program for storage and coding. 
Selected quotations were translated into English.
Data analysis
The study drew upon a social constructivist approach and a thematic analysis was 
developed (Braun and Clarke 2006). To begin, after the careful reading of all tran-
scripts, first-order themes were identified through an open coding procedure and this 
helped to produce a preliminary list of themes. These themes were reduced through 
focused coding to core themes. Then, through selective coding, we identified three 
main themes concerning the diagnostic attribution of GD, which will be outlined in 
Findings section.
Findings
This section will examine how the diagnostic attribution of GD is constructed by 
practitioners in Portugal and the ways in which biological and social ideologies con-
cerning gender might shape this construction. Drawing upon our data analysis, we 
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will focus on three core themes: (a) the alignment of the body and gender identity; 
(b) the importance of cross-gender transitioning; and (c) struggling and accepting 
gender non-conformity.
The alignment of the body and gender identity
We aimed first and foremost to understand GD diagnosis and what was at stake for 
its attribution on the part of practitioners. When asked to explain GD, the practi-
tioners interviewed offered an explanation on gender identity as they believed that 
this concept was important in understanding the diagnosis of GD. What became 
apparent was that most practitioners appeared to interpret GD within what has been 
referred to as a biological model of gender (Whitehead et al. 2012). This was the 
case of Claudia who made the following statement:
The main criteria, is the person feeling discomfort…. which is a much-atten-
uated form… Well, basically it is a huge suffering of not identifying with the 
body that one has. At the end…at the end we confirm… we confirm repeatedly 
that there is a huge incongruence between gender identity, which is a mental 
identity, thus cerebral, and the body that one has. That is, I feel I am a man but 
I am in a woman’s body. Well, the basic criteria for the diagnosis is that.
(Practitioner, 60 years old, 40 years of practice, 30 years working with trans 
people)
The above quote suggests that the diagnostic criteria for GD privileges a gender 
binary definition and to a certain extent shows the determinism within which the 
biological model of gender identity is based. This was also evident in the discourse 
of other practitioners. For José gender identity is rooted in the brain and therefore 
has a biological cause:
They suffer because their brain is normal but is the opposite sex to their body. 
Well, the body is normal but is the opposite sex to their brain. This is why it is 
an illness.
(Practitioner, 70 years old, 40 years of practice, 12 years working with trans 
people)
According to the biological model, cross-gender identification is something per-
sistent and stable throughout the person’s life. Thus, this model does not appear to 
allow room for the existence of other narratives aside from that present from birth 
(McQueen 2016). While some practitioners appeared to adhere to the biological 
model of gender, others understood gender as something constructed throughout the 
person’s life and thereby recognized the fluidity of gender identity, interpreting it 
within what has been called a social model (Whitehead et al. 2012). These findings 
contrast to Pinto and Moleiro’s (2012) research on trans-specific healthcare practices 
in Portugal, where that kind of diversity was not found amongst practitioners. The 
statement made by Mário, who acknowledged the possibility of the creation of fluid 
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gender identities, helps to demonstrate the variety of positions on the nature of gen-
der identity:
Gender Dysphoria places the emphasis not on gender identity but on the suf-
fering that one’s gender identity might bring to the person. Suffering of one-
self. In my understanding, it gives the sense that gender is more fluid. Even by 
being fluid… only the persons who suffer because of this would look for help.
(Practitioner, 40 years old, 15 years of practice, 15 years working with trans 
people)
These findings confirm Whitehead et al. (2012) research on the clinical practice with 
trans people, where it was found that practitioners interpret the diagnosis of GD dif-
ferently according to an identity-based gender ideology. This practitioner, like oth-
ers who follow a social model, adopts a position which understands gender identity 
as fluid and therefore allows room for the diagnostic attribution of GD to people 
who do not correspond to the authentic trans identity (McQueen 2016). Without bio-
markers or scientific tests to prove the diagnosis of GD (Shuster 2016), making deci-
sions on the diagnostic attribution based on the identification of the authentic trans 
identity (McQueen 2016) is problematic as it relies on the assumption of the exist-
ence of a real man and woman (Hird 2002) and, therefore, constrains the validation 
of other forms of identity, apart from the normative gender binary, by practitioners. 
What this also means is that without the diagnosis of GD some trans people might 
not access gender-confirming medical procedures; even when trans people do not 
intend to do genital surgery, they might wish to undergo other gender-confirming 
medical procedures such as breast surgery or hormone therapy.
The importance of cross‑gender transitioning
Practitioners seemed to base their medical decision about GD diagnosis on the 
information provided by trans people, particularly the feeling of discomfort regard-
ing the incongruence between their assigned gender at birth and gender identity. We 
intended to understand the extent to which the feeling of discomfort was verified 
through one’s wish to undergo gender-confirming surgery thus aligning genitalia 
and gender identity. What became evident in our findings was that cross-gender tran-
sitioning throughout gender-confirming surgery, particularly genital surgery, was 
key for most practitioners. The following comment made by André shows that the 
desire for gender-confirming surgery tended to be understood by practitioners as a 
strong gender marker:
A: What defines a transsexual person is that (i.e. genital surgery)! Do you 
understand? A person who arrives here and says: ‘look I like a lot of my body 
but I do not want to do anything to my penis. I do not want to lose it. I just 
want to have a more feminine presentation and to take some hormones.’ Do 
you think this is a transsexual?
T: Well…
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A: It isn’t! There are those who say… even some colleagues of yours…that 
come here to say something… to say that they are. But they aren’t! They 
aren’t! They are not transsexuals! They are transvestites! Do you understand?
(Practitioner, 45 years old, 20 years of practice, 20 years working with trans 
people)
André established a distinction between transsexuals and transvestites. The for-
mer category refers to those who wish to have genital surgery and thereby suffer 
from GD, whereas the latter, because they do not have this desire, are not allowed 
by practitioners to obtain a GD diagnosis and to undergo other gender-confirming 
medical procedures such as hormone therapy. In this light, trans people’s desire to 
change their genitals and to correspond to the gender binary ideal of the real man 
and woman (Hird 2002) marks the determination of gender (Westbrook and Schilt 
2014) and the category attribution (Turowetz and Maynard 2016) of GD diagnosis. 
The following statement made by Diogo helps to demonstrate this point:
T: There are people who for instance have a penis and at the same time have a 
feminine presentation and a beard. They claim to be non-binary. They say they 
are… The speech of these people is that ‘I want this but I do not want that’ and 
‘I want doctors to do what I want’.
D: I do not agree.
T: Well, what would be the diagnosis of these persons?
D: They do not have a diagnosis. Well, at least according to the manual (DSM-
5).
T: Do you think these people should be considered transsexuals (the word was 
frequently used by the interview respondent)?
D: No, I do not. I think these are different people. We do not have a diagnosis 
for them. Probably it will not even be necessary to have a diagnosis for them. 
Well, we need to understand this and only research can determine what these 
people mean.
(Practitioner, 70 years old, 40 years of practice, 40 years working with trans 
people)
Diogo employed a gatekeeping role by limiting access to GD to trans identities out-
side the normative gender binary while pointing out that more research is needed to 
understand which diagnosis should be attributed to people who do not conform to 
the authentic trans ideal. The WPATH in SOC-7 is nevertheless against gatekeeping 
practices, as it states that gender-confirming medical procedures should be primar-
ily based on patients’ decisions and the practitioners’ role should be to help patients 
make informed decisions regarding their transitioning (Davy 2015). The medical 
validation (Westbrook and Schilt 2014) of trans people who do not intend to change 
their bodies to conform to the gender binary ideal did not seem to be problematic on 
the part of practitioners who appeared to follow a social model of gender (White-
head et al. 2012). This was the case of Mário, who highlighted the fact that some 
trans people might not wish to undergo genital surgery as they believe this would 
compromise their gender identity:
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M: I think the majority wants (i.e. to do genital surgery). The majority wants. 
Well, I would not say that it is an absolute majority. It’s a relative majority. 
People that have not yet decided what they want to do… People that do not 
want to do gender confirming surgery. Well, with time I believe there will be 
more people that do not wish to do it.
T: Why do you think with time there will be more?
M: Well, it has to do with what they think is enough for their gender identity. I 
used to say jokingly… my deconstruction… my prediction… is that in the near 
future there will be men with vaginas and women with penises.
(Practitioner, 40 years old, 15 years of practice, 15 years working with trans 
people)
The statement above shows that contrary to what was claimed by Davis et al. (2016), 
practitioners who work with trans people might challenge the gender binary rhetoric 
and respect people’s decisions regarding their bodies. Like Mário, another practi-
tioner, when asked about the importance of trans people’s wish to undergo genital 
surgery for obtaining the diagnosis of GD, stated:
G: No, no! No, no! That (i.e. genital surgery) does not matter to me.
T: Okay.
G: It’s Miguel.
T: Is it related with the identity?
G: It’s Miguel every day. Twenty four hours per day. If he has tits, if he has a 
penis, if he has a vagina or vulva, it does not matter to me.
(Practitioner, 55 years old, 30 years of practice, 20 years working with trans 
people)
This group of practitioners did not base their assumptions around the category attri-
bution of GD on “strict cultural meanings around gendered embodiments and expe-
riences” (Dewey and Gesbeck 2017, p. 60). These practitioners did not actively act 
as gatekeepers but instead tended to facilitate the attribution of the diagnosis of GD 
by giving trans people the power to define their bodies according to their gender 
identities. This finding is similar to what Shuster (2016) described as practitioners 
prioritizing one’s self knowledge and appears to be in accord with the guidelines 
of SOC-7 which enhances a change towards a collaborative model of care where 
gender-confirming medical procedures should be based first and foremost on trans 
people’s decisions (Davy 2015).
Struggling and accepting gender non‑conformity
The accounts suggest that practitioners who recognize the existence of non-binary 
gender identities might not feel able to put them in practice. The difficulties regard-
ing the diagnostic attribution of GD to those who do not correspond to the essential-
ist wrong body ideal (Johnson 2015) were outlined by Francisco:
There is gender diversity… some fit in the diagnosis others don’t. The diag-
nosis serves to guide us in the evaluations that we will propose. The diagno-
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ses also have their history. The diagnosis of Gender Dysphoria is essentially 
the diagnosis of transsexuality of Harry Benjamin in the 1960s. This relates to 
notions… the idea that there are people who are living in the wrong body and 
the idea that people benefit from doing surgery. Well, the diagnosis of Gender 
Dysphoria aims to understand if a person has this type of dysphoria. That is, a 
permanent feeling of living in the other gender. Well, the shape of one’s body 
disturbs the development of one’s gender identity and expression and people 
will benefit from hormone and surgical intervention. The diagnosis is this. 
Well, there are other ways… there is gender diversity. However, the diagnosis 
cannot be applied. This does not mean in my opinion that there is no medical 
intervention to offer to these people. What it means is that it might not be the 
intervention that we offer to transsexuals. I am not thinking in terms of the true 
and fake transsexual. I am thinking about the existent clinical model for what it 
means to be a transsexual.
(Practitioner, 30 years old, 5 years of practice, 5 years working with trans peo-
ple)
This statement is in accord with Davy’s (2015) research on the politics of diagnos-
ing trans people, where it was found that the diagnostic framework in the DSM-5 
draws upon a binary conception of gender and judges trans people according to their 
wish to align their genitals with their gender identity through gender-confirming sur-
gery. The view that trans people are interpreted against this backdrop as having a 
similar trans experience outlined by Shuster (2016) is made apparent in the above 
statement. What also became evident in the comments of a few practitioners is that 
there is insufficient updated scientific information available on trans identities and 
embodiments who do not fit in the authentic trans ideal and that this has a consid-
erable impact on their practice with people who do not position themselves within 
the gender binary. Thus, without enough scientific evidence practitioners might 
have difficulty in attributing GD diagnosis and legitimating access to trans-specific 
healthcare of people with a non-binary gender identity. As Mário explained:
M: Non-binary people are less common in practice. I don’t think this is 
because they think they will be categorized. We have some non-binary people. 
Well, if we want it or not they represent a bigger challenge.
T: In what sense do you think they represent a bigger challenge?
M: Because we have to equate what people bring to us to what is written 
and said in the literature. Even in the literature, each time something new 
appears there is a delay of at least five years in relation to the new infor-
mation being available. For example, with the DSM-5: the use of Gender 
Dysphoria and the abandonment of Gender Identity Disorder. It says: people 
who do not identify themselves with their assigned gender at birth. Previ-
ously what was a reference was the sex. In fact, there are persons who do 
not identify themselves with their gender and assigned gender at birth but 
do not totally identify themselves with the opposite gender and want to be 
more androgynous. This, in terms of our classical evaluation and formal 
practice, raises some doubts. This raising of doubts does not mean that we 
doubt what people say but has to do with the diagnosis itself. Well, because 
(Re) Making gender in the clinical context: a look at how…
we know that certain diagnoses give evidence that certain treatments work. 
That is, a certain population with more gender variability, diversity or fluid-
ity do not correspond with the binary transsexual. I am not sure, and there 
are no studies which show this, that the same strategies in terms of therapy 
or surgeries will be equally good for some as it is for others.
(Practitioner, 40 years old, 15 years of practice, 15 years working with trans 
people)
Mário pointed out that the recent change in the DSM of the use of the term Gen-
der Identity Disorder (GID in DSM-IV) to Gender Dysphoria (GD in DSM-5) 
allowed room for people with a non-binary gender identity to look for clinical 
support unlike what happened in the past:
Well, the change from Gender Identity Disorder to Gender Dysphoria… 
These are different concepts. We are not talking about the same thing. Then, 
Gender Dysphoria can open a path…as I previously said…for non-binary 
people to look for help because the focus has more to do with the discom-
fort that might exist. Well, in terms of the multidisciplinary team and the 
part medicine plays, we can offer something to these people that might help 
to diminish the dysphoria.
(Practitioner, 40 years old, 15 years of practice, 15 years working with trans 
people)
The change from GID to GD aimed to tackle the distress that trans people feel 
between their assigned gender at birth and their gender identity (Davy 2015; 
Dewey and Gesbeck 2017). The use of the word trans by practitioners also helps 
to illustrate their openness to the existence of different gender identities and 
expressions as the term is more inclusive. This point was outlined by Francisco:
I think the categorization of the word trans has some advantages. I think 
the advantages of using the word trans is that it calls for a notion of gender 
diversity. That is, the affirmation that there are other ways of living gender, 
which are very diverse.
(Practitioner, 30 years old, 5 years of practice, 5 years working with trans 
people)
We nevertheless found, once again, contrasting viewpoints from practitioners 
regarding non-binary identities. Trans people who did not desire gender-con-
firming surgery and thereby did not correspond to the authentic trans ideal were 
understood by the practitioners who interpreted gender identity within a biologi-
cal model as not trans enough (Mog and Swarr 2008). The following statement 
by André clearly shows this point:
The transsexual suffers horrors! The transsexual does everything to equate 
his/her body with his/her soul. Then he/she will do everything even, as I 
previously told you, to be submitted to breast surgery without anaesthesia 
because the anaesthetist was on strike.
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(Practitioner, 45 years old, 20 years of practice, 20 years working with trans 
people)
The biological gender-identity ideology evident in André’s statement is supported 
by the DSM-5 narrow understanding of trans identities and bodies (Davy 2015). 
André, who closely followed these guidelines (Shuster 2016), classified trans people 
who do not wish to change their genitalia and do not intend to move from one binary 
gender position to the other as abnormal:
T: What do you think about people who define themselves as non-binary?
A: I think it is bizarre! I think it is a nonsense!
T: Why?
A: Why? Because there is no such thing! People are what they are! People…
human beings… human beings are what they are. That is, a complex being. 
Humans are masculine or feminine. It is a genetic thing. Do you understand?
This view on trans embodiments is in line with Davis et  al. (2016) research on 
intersex (people who are born with both male and female biological characteristics 
including genital, gonadal and/or chromosomal) and medicalization practices, where 
it was found that any embodiment which does not align biological sex, gender iden-
tity and sexuality according to the heterosexual imaginary is understood by practi-
tioners as pathological and morbid. As outlined earlier, we found contrasting posi-
tions on this matter and a more nuanced perspective on the part of practitioners who 
work with trans people than that described in previous studies (Johnson 2015; Davis 
et al. 2016; McQueen 2016; Dewey and Gesbeck 2017).
Discussion
The current study aimed to provide a better understanding of gender subjectivities 
within the diagnostic attribution of GD by practitioners who work with trans people 
in Portugal. The findings highlighted here offer a more nuanced perspective on trans-
specific healthcare practices than that described in research conducted in Portugal 
(Pinto and Moleiro 2012) and elsewhere (Davis et al. 2016). Practitioners’ accounts 
on the attribution of the diagnosis of GD show a diversity not sufficiently acknowl-
edged within sociological and transgender literature—although there have been a 
few exceptions (Whitehead et al. 2012; Shuster 2016). We further extend these stud-
ies (ibid) by demonstrating that practitioners who operate under a social model of 
gender are opening space for trans people to be treated as experts of their bodies and 
identities. While it might not be true for practitioners who can be positioned within 
a biological model of gender, we found evidence that practitioners who work with 
trans people are allowing room for the self-definition of gender identification.
Within a country characterized by a strong welfare state like Portugal, it was not 
surprising a paternalistic approach to the diagnostic attribution of GD (Linander 
et al. 2017a), where practitioners act as gatekeepers (Hilário 2018), underpinned by 
the belief they are acting in the best interests of patients (Silva and Osswald 2010), 
i.e. in this case the best interests of trans persons, was adopted. Nevertheless, by 
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employing a gatekeeping role and following a biological model of gender practition-
ers are in fact limiting the access to GD diagnosis and therefore to gender-confirm-
ing medical procedures of trans people who do not conform to the gender binary 
ideal and compromising their rights to trans-specific healthcare (Davis et al. 2016). 
This might be the case for trans people who position themselves within the gender-
queer umbrella and might wish, for instance, to take hormones for breast augmenta-
tion without ever doing genital surgery, to undertake top surgery to remove their 
breasts without ever taking hormones or undergoing genital surgery, to undergo gen-
ital surgery without doing breast augmentation or pursue hormone transition.
Unlike the practitioners who follow a biological model, the practitioners who 
can be positioned within what Whitehead et  al. (2012) refer to as a social model 
of gender did not limit the attribution of GD diagnosis and access to trans-specific 
healthcare to trans people who identify beyond gender binary. Practitioners who 
were open to the existence of a variety of gender identities and expressions made 
some efforts to integrate, as best they could, gender diversity in their practice despite 
the lack of guidelines in DSM-5 regarding this matter. These practitioners appeared 
to support the collaborative approach to care enhanced by the WPATH by giving 
trans people the chance to make their own decisions regarding their gender identifi-
cation and, ultimately, their transitioning. The WPATH believes that a collaborative 
model would help to reduce the worldwide problems concerning access, provision 
and delivery of trans-specific healthcare, in particular for trans people who do not 
conform to the gender binary ideal (Davy 2015).
The findings presented here support Linander et al. (2017b) argument that practi-
tioners who work with trans people should have a more confirming approach to care 
which potentiates the self-determination of trans people instead of the conforming 
approach evident here in the practices employed by the practitioners who follow a 
biological model of gender. The practitioners who employed a social model of gen-
der in their work are in line with the wishes and needs of trans people who do not 
conform to the gender binary ideal by allowing them room for the self-definition 
of gender identification and respecting their rights to trans-specific healthcare. In 
contrast to Linander et al. (2017b) who conducted research with trans people about 
trans-specific healthcare practices, we offer empirical evidence from those in the 
hands of care, i.e. on the part of medical and psychological practitioners who work 
with trans people. Unlike what has been described by Davis (2015) in their research 
about the medicalization of intersexuality, we found evidence that practitioners who 
follow a social model of gender have been, to a certain extent, influenced by the 
theoretical arguments of feminist scholarship. Thus, our findings are in line with the 
suggestion made by Linander et al. (2017b) that an awareness and critical thinking 
about gender binary norms could help to change trans-specific healthcare practices.
The study provides another lens for understanding the diagnostic attribution of 
GD by paying attention to the accounts of practitioners and shedding light on those 
who embrace the self-definition of gender identification. Thus, our work and that 
of a few others (Whitehead et al. 2012; Shuster 2016) show heterogeneity amongst 
the practices employed by the medical and psychological practitioners who work 
with trans people. We outlined the nuances and complexities around the diagnos-
tic attribution of GD and highlighted how ideologies regarding gender shape this 
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attribution in Portugal. The openness on the part of some practitioners towards the 
self-definition of gender identification cannot be isolated from the political debate 
over the dissociation between medical and legal gender recognition that has been 
taking place in Portugal and across the globe (Davy et al. 2018; Hilário 2018). The 
conclusions presented here are tentative and further research is required with prac-
titioners in other contexts to understand the extent to which they are allowing room 
for the self-definition of gender identification. We claim that the change towards the 
self-determination of trans people in Portugal and elsewhere needs to go hand in 
hand with appropriate changes in clinical guidelines, particularly regarding non-
binary gender identities.
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